

Empirical Indian Political Economy

Draft Syllabus

Course and Contact Information

Course	: XX, Special Topics in the Politics of India
Semester	: Fall 2019
Meeting time	: XX
Location	: XX

Instructor

Name	: Aaditya Dar
Campus Address	: XX
E-mail	: aaditya@gwu.edu
Office hours	: XX and by appointment

Course Description

The objective of this course is to provide a survey of the literature on Indian politics with special focus on topics in the political economy of development, party system, political selection, patron-client relationships, voter behavior, service delivery, corruption and conflict. It also aims to introduce students to various empirical approaches used for causal inference in scholarly work.

Learning Outcomes

1. *Analyze* and explain recent empirical trends in the political economy of India.
2. *Identify* and critique arguments of a paper and build a critical understanding of the literature.
3. *Evaluate* the causal claims of the paper and learn to execute various identification strategies.
4. *Develop* a proposal for original research in Indian political economy.

Grades

The course will be graded using the following weights:

- Problem set 1 : 15%
- Problem set 2 : 15%
- Referee report : 10%
- Research proposal : 60%

The problem sets will be based on replication exercises that involve programing. They will be based on replication exercises and test whether students are adept at various causal inference statistical techniques. In addition, students are also required to submit a referee report from a shortlisted selection of papers that will be shared with the class at the beginning of the semester. Finally, students must also submit a research proposal (8-10 pages) that describes the project, surveys the existing literature and identifies a reliable

empirical strategy to test the hypothesis. Preliminary results may also be presented, although they are not necessary.

Course Curriculum

1. Introduction to political economy

Bardhan, P. (1999). *The Political Economy of Development in India: Expanded edition with an epilogue on the political economy of reform in India. OUP Catalogue.*

Rudolph, L. I., & Rudolph, S. H. (1987). *In pursuit of Lakshmi: The political economy of the Indian state.* University of Chicago Press.

Dreze, J., & Sen, A. (1999). *India: Economic development and social opportunity. OUP Catalogue.*

Kohli, A. (2004). *State-directed development: political power and industrialization in the global periphery.* Cambridge University Press.

Sinha, A. (2000). *Divided leviathan: comparing subnational development states in India.* Cornell University.

2. Political Parties

Chandra, K. (2007). *Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India.* Cambridge University Press.

Chhibber, P. K. (2010). *Democracy without associations: transformation of the party system and social cleavages in India.* University of Michigan Press.

Ziegfeld, A. (2012). Coalition government and party system change: Explaining the rise of regional political parties in India. *Comparative Politics*, 45(1), 69-87.

Chhibber, P., Jensenius, F. R., & Suryanarayan, P. (2014). Party organization and party proliferation in India. *Party Politics*, 20(4), 489-505.

Huber, J. D., & Suryanarayan, P. (2016). Ethnic inequality and the ethnification of political parties: Evidence from India. *World Politics*, 68(1), 149-188.

Empirical strategy: Ordinary least squares

3. Decline of Congress and rise of BJP

Frankel, F., & Rao, M. S. A. (1989). *Dominance and state power in India: Decline of a Social Order.* Oxford University Press.

Narain, I. (1976). *State politics in India.* Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan.

Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005). History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India. *American economic review*, 95(4), 1190-1213.

Dasgupta, A. (2018). Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of the Green Revolution in India. *American Political Science Review*, 1-21.

Thachil, T. (2014). *Elite parties, poor voters: How social services win votes in India*. Cambridge University Press.

Suryanarayan, P. (2018). When Do the Poor Vote for the Right Wing and Why: Status Hierarchy and Vote Choice in the Indian States. *Comparative Political Studies*.

Empirical Strategy: Instrumental Variables

4. Selection of candidates: Dynasties, Naya Netas and Criminals

Roy, R. (1967). Selection of Congress Candidates. IV: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Applicants. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 371-376.

Banerji, A. V., Imbert, C., & Pande, R. (2017). Entry, exit and candidate selection: Evidence from India. Working Paper.

Besley, T. J., Pande, R., & Rao, V. (2005). Political selection and the quality of government: Evidence from South India. Working paper.

Chandra, K. (Ed.). (2016). *Democratic dynasties: state, party, and family in contemporary Indian politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Vaishnav, M. (2017). *When crime pays: Money and muscle in Indian politics*. Yale University Press.

Krishna, A. (2002). *Active social capital: Tracing the roots of development and democracy*. Columbia University Press.

Asher, S., & Novosad, P. Rent-Seeking and Criminal Politicians: Evidence from Mining Booms. Working paper.

Empirical strategy: Randomized control trial

5. Politician's identity, electoral quotas and public goods

Jensenius, F. R. (2015). Development from representation? A study of quotas for the scheduled castes in India. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 7(3), 196-220.

Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2004). Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5), 1409-1443.

Bhavnani, R. R. (2009). Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural experiment in India. *American Political Science Review*, 103(1), 23-35.

Pande, R. (2003). Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India. *American Economic Review*, 93(4), 1132-1151.

Bhalotra, S., Clots-Figueras, I., Cassan, G., & Iyer, L. (2014). Religion, politician identity and development outcomes: Evidence from India. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 104, 4-17.

Blakeslee, D. (2015). Politics and Public Goods in Developing Countries: Evidence from the Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Working paper.

Clots-Figueras, I. (2011). Women in politics: Evidence from the Indian States. *Journal of public Economics*, 95(7-8), 664-690.

Empirical Strategy: Propensity Score Matching

6. Political cycles and political connections

Baskaran, T., Min, B., & Uppal, Y. (2015). Election cycles and electricity provision: Evidence from a quasi-experiment with Indian special elections. *Journal of Public Economics*, 126, 64-73.

Cole, S. (2009). Fixing market failures or fixing elections? Agricultural credit in India. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(1), 219-50.

Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian states. *Journal of development Economics*, 73(1), 125-154.

Mitra, A., Mitra, S., & Mukherji, A. (2017). *Cash for votes: Evidence from India* (No. 1711). School of Economics Discussion Papers.

Rajani, I. (2016). Are Public Funds Used to Maintain Ruling Coalitions? Evidence from India. Working paper.

Kapur, D., & Vaishnav, M. (2013). Quid pro quo: Builders, politicians, and election finance in India. Working paper.

Sukhtankar, S. (2012). Sweetening the deal? political connections and sugar mills in India. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 4(3), 43-63.

Bohlken, A. & Darsey, J. (2018) How Electoral Cycles Shape the Implementation of Public Programs: Evidence from India. Working paper.

Empirical Strategy: Event Study and Difference-in-Differences

7. Voting

Ahuja, A., & Chhibber, P. (2012). Why the poor vote in India: “If I don’t vote, I am dead to the state”. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 47(4), 389-410.

Jensenius, F. and Suryanarayan, P. (2018) “Party Institutionalization and Economic Voting: Evidence from the Indian States”. Working Paper.

Linden, L. L. (2004). Are incumbents really advantaged? The preference for non-incumbents in Indian national elections. *Unpublished paper*.

Uppal, Y. (2009). The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures. *Public Choice*, 138(1-2), 9-27.

Patnam, M. (2013). Learning from Exit Polls in Sequential Elections: Evidence from a Policy Experiment in India. Working paper.

Empirical Strategy: Regression Discontinuity Design

8. Gender

Prillaman, S. (2016). Strength in numbers: How women's networks close India's political gender gap. In *American Political Science Association Conference, Philadelphia*.

Chhibber, P. (2002). Why are some women politically active? The household, public space, and political participation in India. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43(3-5), 409-429.

Kapoor, M., & Ravi, S. (2013). Women voters in Indian democracy: A silent revolution. Working paper.

Kumar, S., & Gupta, P. (2015). Changing patterns of women's turnout in Indian elections. *Studies in Indian Politics*, 3(1), 7-18.

Badrinathan, S. & Kapur, D. (2018). Does The Water Flow Uphill? The Effect of Having a Girl Child on Parental Political Attitudes in Urban India. Working paper.

Brule, R., & Gaikwad, N. (2017). Culture, Capital and the Gender Gap in Political Economy Preferences: Evidence from Meghalaya's Tribes. Working paper.

Empirical Strategy: Paired Matched Design

9. Constituency service and clientelism: fixers, brokers and middlemen

Auerbach, A. M., & Thachil, T. (2018). How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums. *American Political Science Review*, 1-17.

Bussell, J. (2018). Clients and Constituents. *Book Manuscript: University of California, Berkeley*.

Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (Eds.). (2007). Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, S., Francois, P., & Kotwal, A. (2015). Clientelism in Indian villages. *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1780-1816.

Reddy, G. R., & Haragopal, G. (1985). The Pyraveekar: "The Fixer" in Rural India. *Asian Survey*, 25(11), 1148-1162.

Manor, J. (2004). 'Towel over armpit': small-time political 'fixers' in India's states. *India and the politics of developing countries: Essays in memory of Myron Weiner*, 61-83.

Berenschot, W. (2010). Everyday mediation: The politics of public service delivery in Gujarat, India. *Development and Change*, 41(5), 883-905.

Simon, G. L. (2009). Geographies of mediation: market development and the rural broker in Maharashtra, India. *Political Geography*, 28(3), 197-207.

Auerbach, A. M. (2016). Clients and communities: The political economy of party network organization and development in India's urban slums. *World Politics*, 68(1), 111-148.

Empirical Strategy: Conjoint Experiment

10. Politics of the provision of public goods

Iyer, L. (2010). Direct versus indirect colonial rule in India: Long-term consequences. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(4), 693-713.

Nooruddin, I. (2011). *Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments*. Cambridge University Press.

Banerjee, A., & Somanathan, R. (2007). The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India. *Journal of Development Economics*, 82(2), 287-314.

Asher, S., & Novosad, P. (2017). Politics and local economic growth: Evidence from India. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(1), 229-73.

Thachil, T., & Teitelbaum, E. (2015). Ethnic parties and public spending: New theory and evidence from the Indian states. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(11), 1389-1420.

Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), 1415-1451.

Empirical Strategy: Fixed effects

11. Bureaucracy

Gulzar, S., & Pasquale, B. J. (2017). Politicians, bureaucrats, and development: Evidence from India. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1), 162-183.

Dasgupta, A., & Kapur, D. (2017). The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Effectiveness: Evidence from Local Rural Development Officials in India. Working paper.

Bhavnani, R. R., & Lee, A. (2018). Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service. Working paper.

Neggers, Y. (2018). Enfranchising Your Own? Experimental Evidence on Bureaucrat Diversity and Election Bias in India. *American Economic Review*, 108(6), 1288-1321.

Bayley, D. H. (2015). *Police and political development in India* (Vol. 2307). Princeton University Press.

Iyer, L., & Mani, A. (2012). Traveling agents: political change and bureaucratic turnover in India. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(3), 723-739.

Nath, A. (2015). Bureaucrats and Politicians: How Does Electoral Competition Affect Bureaucratic Performance?. *Institute for Economic Development (IED) Working Paper*, 269.

Xu, G. The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire. *American Economic Review*. Forthcoming.

Empirical Strategy: Geographic Regression Discontinuity

12. Corruption

Witsoe, J. (2012). Everyday Corruption and the Political Mediation of the Indian State. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 47(6), 47.

Gupta, A. (2012). *Red tape: Bureaucracy, structural violence, and poverty in India*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Bussell, J. (2012). *Corruption and reform in India: public services in the digital age*. Cambridge University Press.

Weaver, J. (2016). *Jobs for Sale: Corruption and Misallocation in Hiring*. Working paper.

Wade, R. (1982). The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 18(3), 287-328.

Empirical Strategy: Ethnography

13. Hindu-Muslim Violence

Brass, P. R. (1997). *Theft of an idol: Text and context in the representation of collective violence*. Princeton University Press.

Wilkinson, S. I. (2006). *Votes and violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India*. Cambridge University Press.

Varshney, A. (2003). *Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. Yale University Press.

Jha, S. (2013). Trade, institutions, and ethnic tolerance: Evidence from South Asia. *American political Science review*, 107(4), 806-832.

Mitra, A., & Ray, D. (2014). Implications of an economic theory of conflict: Hindu-Muslim violence in India. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(4), 719-765.

Nellis, G., Weaver, M., & Rosenzweig, S. (2016). Do parties matter for ethnic violence? Evidence from India. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 11(3), 249-277.

Empirical Strategy: Combined IV-RDD

14. Conflict in the countryside: Naxal violence

Kumar, A. (2006). *Community Warriors*. Anthem Press.

Fetzer, T. (2014). Can workfare programs moderate violence? Evidence from India. Working paper.

Kapur, D., Gawande, K., & Satyanath, S. (2012). Renewable resource shocks and conflict in India's Maoist belt. Working paper.

Vanden Eynde, O. (2018). Targets of violence: evidence from India's Naxalite conflict. *The Economic Journal*, 128(609), 887-916.

Verghese, A., & Teitelbaum, E. (2018). Conquest and Conflict: The Colonial Roots of Maoist Violence in India. Working paper.

Gomes, J. F. (2015). The political economy of the Maoist conflict in India: an empirical analysis. *World Development*, 68, 96-123.

Mukherjee, S. (2017). Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India: Historical Institutions and Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Empirical Strategy: Rainfall as an IV

Course Communication

Blackboard

We will use Blackboard on a regular basis to post announcements, documents, readings as well as your grades. Get into the habit of checking Blackboard once or twice a week. To access Blackboard, go to <https://blackboard.gwu.edu> and login using your GW mail username (NetID).

Use of Email

Please prefix the subject line with [Econ 8999] when emailing me. In case you don't hear from me in 48 hours, please resend the email. Feel free to email to:

1. Inform me about real emergencies and/or excused absences.
2. Send interesting articles related to topics we are covering in class.
3. Ask for brief clarifications on lectures or class policies.

However, do NOT use email to ask for lengthy explanations on problem sets. Such questions must be asked during office hours.

Excused Absences and Required Documentation

The following are considered absences that may be excused, provided adequate documentation is submitted ahead of the excused absence. In cases of emergency, the professors may accept documentation after the absence.

1. University-designated religious holidays
<https://students.gwu.edu/sites/students.gwu.edu/files/downloads/2016-2017ReligiousHolidayCalendar.pdf> (Please see below for university policy)
2. Athletics: all athletes MUST submit two copies of a green Athletics Department form with dates of absence at least one week before the absence.

3. Serious illness or hospitalization: signed note from doctor (date of the visit as well as doctor's contact info must be on document) stating the student is too ill to attend classes and requires bed rest for a stated period of time (with dates). A visit to see a doctor does NOT count as an excused absence.
4. Death of relatives: a copy of the obituary or a funeral notice must be provided.

University Policies

University Policy on Religious Holidays

1. Students should notify faculty during the first week of the semester of their intention to be absent from class on their day(s) of religious observance.
2. Faculty should extend to these students the courtesy of absence without penalty on such occasions, including permission to make up examinations.
3. Faculty who intend to observe a religious holiday should arrange at the beginning of the semester to reschedule missed classes or to make other provisions for their course-related activities

Support for Students Outside the Classroom

Disability Support Services (DSS)

Any student who may need an accommodation based on the potential impact of a disability should contact the Disability Support Services office at 202-994-8250 in the Rome Hall, Suite 102, to establish eligibility and to coordinate reasonable accommodations. For additional information please refer to: gwired.gwu.edu/dss/

Mental Health Services 202-994-5300

The University's Mental Health Services offers 24/7 assistance and referral to address students' personal, social, career, and study skills problems. Services for students include: crisis and emergency mental health consultations confidential assessment, counseling services (individual and small group), and referrals. For additional information please refer to: <https://counselingcenter.gwu.edu/>

The Care Network

The college experience can often be challenging, and asking for help can be difficult for some students. The CARE Network reaches out to offer support so that students can be as successful as possible through graduation. At GW, the CARE Network is a cross-departmental support system which recognizes that student concerns are often multi-faceted. Students are connected to resources through inter-departmental collaboration to provide them with appropriate and personalized outreach. Students, parents, faculty and staff can identify students that may need additional support through an online form. Based on the type of support needed, a student is connected to a trained staff member who works with them one-on-one for as long as they may need the help. Challenges are part of the college experience; through the CARE Network, students are given the support they need to persist and succeed at GW and beyond. To file an Online Care Report, go to: https://gwu-advocate.symplcity.com/care_report/index.php/pid903038?

Academic Integrity Code

Academic dishonesty is defined as cheating of any kind, including misrepresenting one's own work, taking credit for the work of others without crediting them and without appropriate authorization, and the

fabrication of information. For the remainder of the code, see: studentconduct.gwu.edu/code-academic-integrity

Security

In the case of an emergency, if at all possible, the class should shelter in place. If the building that the class is in is affected, students should follow the evacuation procedures for the building. After evacuation, seek shelter at a predetermined rendezvous location.